I brought up in class the other day the question of whether or not the mass killings of certain species of animals should be genocide; a notable example is Mao's annihilation of China's sparrows in order to create a scapegoat for failing crops. Ms. Finn told me to go look up the views of an Ethicist, Peter Singer, and see what he had to say.
Singer is a sort of Utilitarian—basically he says that whatever action causes the least suffering to the parties involved is the right one. Thus it could be unjust to kill someone that wants to live, but very just indeed to kill someone that wants to die. He then goes on to say that is the party involved has no preference, if the party cannot conceptualize life and death, existence and non-existence, and if they are killed in a painless fashion, then no harm has been done.
I considered his views, but I find them to be horribly erroneous. He assumes first of all that animals have no consciousness. To assume that consciousness appears only in humans has neither physical nor meta-physical proof to support it. Indeed I would say that an animal possession of consciousness is a rather straightforward observation. In his own words "only a person can have an int erst in living; a non-person cannot." Talk about ignorant tautologies. I am pretty sure that animals have interests in living; they possess fear, first of all. Anyone who has had a dog knows that they can love as well as a "person" can. But It's cowardly to attack meta-physical standpoints with physical counter examples.
The core of Singer's argument rests in is classification of "person" and "non-person." A person, by his definition, is one that has consciousness, or at least a high enough level of consciousness to descriminate between existence and not existence, while a "non-person" cannot.
Therefore I pose this question: If someone is in a coma, and it is known that they will wake-up and become a "person" again, in say, nine month's time, it it acceptable to kill them? Or like-wise, with an unborn child, if it is known that they will become a "person" can it be okay to kill them now, simply because they have not yet grasped the concept of existence? From what I've read of Singer's positions, he would say yes—but all of this is based of of a human definition of time! Singer himself says that one should not give pain unduly to animals because of "speciesism," or simply because the animal in question has fur or wings or is in some way biologically differ ant from humans. Yet the human consciousness serves the same purpose as the animal; to survive. Our superior intelligence, our consciousness, is simply another evolutionary survival method; our definition of time is another one of these evolutionary assets. Singer then uses the fact that we possess this more advanced state of evolution to justify the murder of other forms of life less evolved than ourselves. He says that if the animals do not feel pain then no crime has been commit ed, yet the animal in question is as alive as we, the only difference being a discrepancy in intelligence—we both wish to live, that is our biological purpose, we both have evolved in differant manners, yet by Singer's definition that alone does not justify murder. We, like the animals we kill, are also animals, built for survival. There is no difference between noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and so struggling to survive, and not noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and struggling to survive. It is the struggle that counts. The body wishes it, intelligence and the like are simply more limbs, claws, wings, that the body uses to sustain its existence. Therefore animals wish to survive as much as we do. And therefore, by Singer's definition, it is immoral to kill them.
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I think that, aside from all of the interesting theories on morality and consiousness and whatnot, the basic reason that mass killings of animals is not considered a genocide is because we as a human race could not handle it. Practically every society would then be guilty of genocide because practically every society is currently hunting some specie of animal to near extinction. Many are already extinct. If we are considering this idea of extinction in the context of genocide, then the human race has wiped off entire "cultures" of animals with characteristics unique to that speices, never to roam the Earth again. In the ocean alone, between intensive whaling 100 years ago and current hugely destructive fishing methods that kill off hoards of fish, many of which are bycatch and are thrown dead back into the water, we have destroyed entire communities that will never recover. Could the human race handle this?
Our associations with genocide are horrible. As one of the speakers said, it is the ultimate crime. Most people think of horrors like the Nazi concentration camps, piles of skulls, deaths in the hundreds of thousands. If the definition of genocide included animals, either our connotations of genocide would change (and most likely lessen the fear that the word inspires) or we would not be able to live with ourselves. Perhaps there would be a lot more vegetarians. But then what about genocide against the plants? By this point, it can go on and on because essentially I think we are committing genocide against the entire Earth, every second of every day.
The real reason that animals are not included in the definition of genocide is that we as a collection of societies on this Earth could not handle it.
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