Hi everyone,
Today Ms. Finn asked us whether or not she should put up a poster for Veteran's Day that depicted a flag waving among clouds witht he sun shining through it, and had the words "Veterans Day" on it. Given the current war, we debated whether or not puttin gup the poster would show support for the war, support for the troops, support for the country, or just support for all American soldiers who have fought in battle. Would not putting it up after having gotten it in the mail automatically show a lack of support? Since the decision was based on a genocide class majority rule vote and people might have had some lingering questions/comments, maybe we could bring them here. What do you think should have been done about the poster and why?
Thursday, October 18, 2007
Peter Singer.. Read More Before Making a Decision
Dear Class:
First, thanks to Thom for thinking about the issue of animal rights in relationship to the themes of the course and for following through on my suggestion to look into the ideas and writings of philosopher Peter Singer.
I have two responses that I feel need to be highlighted as postings rather than comments.
First, please dig a bit more into the writings of Singer. His views on animal rights are not presented quite accurately in the previous posting. While this link is to an editorial, it may be helpful. Peter Singer's own primary source writings on animal rights can be found on his website.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3926371,00.html
Also, the reason that animal rights are not discussed in a history seminar on genocide is that we are looking at a specific legal definition (1948 UN convention) for our terminology as well as the other statues of international law. We are looking at the implications of what can be known about HUMAN identity, obligation, justice, etc. I believe that the conversation about animal rights/philosophy on the topic is interesting and compelling. Yet, I do not think that the topic falls within the scope and sequence of the course.
What do you think? (Please answer after review the scope and sequence that is presented in the syllabus).
First, thanks to Thom for thinking about the issue of animal rights in relationship to the themes of the course and for following through on my suggestion to look into the ideas and writings of philosopher Peter Singer.
I have two responses that I feel need to be highlighted as postings rather than comments.
First, please dig a bit more into the writings of Singer. His views on animal rights are not presented quite accurately in the previous posting. While this link is to an editorial, it may be helpful. Peter Singer's own primary source writings on animal rights can be found on his website.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3926371,00.html
Also, the reason that animal rights are not discussed in a history seminar on genocide is that we are looking at a specific legal definition (1948 UN convention) for our terminology as well as the other statues of international law. We are looking at the implications of what can be known about HUMAN identity, obligation, justice, etc. I believe that the conversation about animal rights/philosophy on the topic is interesting and compelling. Yet, I do not think that the topic falls within the scope and sequence of the course.
What do you think? (Please answer after review the scope and sequence that is presented in the syllabus).
Animal Genocide
I brought up in class the other day the question of whether or not the mass killings of certain species of animals should be genocide; a notable example is Mao's annihilation of China's sparrows in order to create a scapegoat for failing crops. Ms. Finn told me to go look up the views of an Ethicist, Peter Singer, and see what he had to say.
Singer is a sort of Utilitarian—basically he says that whatever action causes the least suffering to the parties involved is the right one. Thus it could be unjust to kill someone that wants to live, but very just indeed to kill someone that wants to die. He then goes on to say that is the party involved has no preference, if the party cannot conceptualize life and death, existence and non-existence, and if they are killed in a painless fashion, then no harm has been done.
I considered his views, but I find them to be horribly erroneous. He assumes first of all that animals have no consciousness. To assume that consciousness appears only in humans has neither physical nor meta-physical proof to support it. Indeed I would say that an animal possession of consciousness is a rather straightforward observation. In his own words "only a person can have an int erst in living; a non-person cannot." Talk about ignorant tautologies. I am pretty sure that animals have interests in living; they possess fear, first of all. Anyone who has had a dog knows that they can love as well as a "person" can. But It's cowardly to attack meta-physical standpoints with physical counter examples.
The core of Singer's argument rests in is classification of "person" and "non-person." A person, by his definition, is one that has consciousness, or at least a high enough level of consciousness to descriminate between existence and not existence, while a "non-person" cannot.
Therefore I pose this question: If someone is in a coma, and it is known that they will wake-up and become a "person" again, in say, nine month's time, it it acceptable to kill them? Or like-wise, with an unborn child, if it is known that they will become a "person" can it be okay to kill them now, simply because they have not yet grasped the concept of existence? From what I've read of Singer's positions, he would say yes—but all of this is based of of a human definition of time! Singer himself says that one should not give pain unduly to animals because of "speciesism," or simply because the animal in question has fur or wings or is in some way biologically differ ant from humans. Yet the human consciousness serves the same purpose as the animal; to survive. Our superior intelligence, our consciousness, is simply another evolutionary survival method; our definition of time is another one of these evolutionary assets. Singer then uses the fact that we possess this more advanced state of evolution to justify the murder of other forms of life less evolved than ourselves. He says that if the animals do not feel pain then no crime has been commit ed, yet the animal in question is as alive as we, the only difference being a discrepancy in intelligence—we both wish to live, that is our biological purpose, we both have evolved in differant manners, yet by Singer's definition that alone does not justify murder. We, like the animals we kill, are also animals, built for survival. There is no difference between noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and so struggling to survive, and not noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and struggling to survive. It is the struggle that counts. The body wishes it, intelligence and the like are simply more limbs, claws, wings, that the body uses to sustain its existence. Therefore animals wish to survive as much as we do. And therefore, by Singer's definition, it is immoral to kill them.
Singer is a sort of Utilitarian—basically he says that whatever action causes the least suffering to the parties involved is the right one. Thus it could be unjust to kill someone that wants to live, but very just indeed to kill someone that wants to die. He then goes on to say that is the party involved has no preference, if the party cannot conceptualize life and death, existence and non-existence, and if they are killed in a painless fashion, then no harm has been done.
I considered his views, but I find them to be horribly erroneous. He assumes first of all that animals have no consciousness. To assume that consciousness appears only in humans has neither physical nor meta-physical proof to support it. Indeed I would say that an animal possession of consciousness is a rather straightforward observation. In his own words "only a person can have an int erst in living; a non-person cannot." Talk about ignorant tautologies. I am pretty sure that animals have interests in living; they possess fear, first of all. Anyone who has had a dog knows that they can love as well as a "person" can. But It's cowardly to attack meta-physical standpoints with physical counter examples.
The core of Singer's argument rests in is classification of "person" and "non-person." A person, by his definition, is one that has consciousness, or at least a high enough level of consciousness to descriminate between existence and not existence, while a "non-person" cannot.
Therefore I pose this question: If someone is in a coma, and it is known that they will wake-up and become a "person" again, in say, nine month's time, it it acceptable to kill them? Or like-wise, with an unborn child, if it is known that they will become a "person" can it be okay to kill them now, simply because they have not yet grasped the concept of existence? From what I've read of Singer's positions, he would say yes—but all of this is based of of a human definition of time! Singer himself says that one should not give pain unduly to animals because of "speciesism," or simply because the animal in question has fur or wings or is in some way biologically differ ant from humans. Yet the human consciousness serves the same purpose as the animal; to survive. Our superior intelligence, our consciousness, is simply another evolutionary survival method; our definition of time is another one of these evolutionary assets. Singer then uses the fact that we possess this more advanced state of evolution to justify the murder of other forms of life less evolved than ourselves. He says that if the animals do not feel pain then no crime has been commit ed, yet the animal in question is as alive as we, the only difference being a discrepancy in intelligence—we both wish to live, that is our biological purpose, we both have evolved in differant manners, yet by Singer's definition that alone does not justify murder. We, like the animals we kill, are also animals, built for survival. There is no difference between noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and so struggling to survive, and not noticing the difference between existence and non-existence, and struggling to survive. It is the struggle that counts. The body wishes it, intelligence and the like are simply more limbs, claws, wings, that the body uses to sustain its existence. Therefore animals wish to survive as much as we do. And therefore, by Singer's definition, it is immoral to kill them.
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